Quiz 15

  1. The Argument from Subjectivity for dualism essentially claims that:
    mental states are not the same as physical states because the property of there being ‘something it is like’ to have that state, which is available only from the perspective of whoever has the state, is something that mental states have and physical states don’t.
  2. Materialists may try to prove that the first premise of the Argument from Subjectivity is false by claiming that:
    in some cases, other people can know more about a person’s mental states than the person who has the mental state. The first premise is that there is “something it is like” to have a mental state, which is uniquely available from the perspective of the person with the state. This tries to prove that mental states are not privileged in this way.
  3. Fodor criticizes interactionism in part because, he claims,:
    the laws of physics will be broken if a non-physical thing changes a physical thing. See page 1/paragraph 5.
  4. Methodological behaviorism is historically important because:
    it allowed psychology to develop as an empirical science.
  5. The theory of mind called logical behaviorism holds that:
    the meaning of mental terms is equivalent to behavioral hypotheticals expressing behavioral dispositions (that is, how one is disposed to respond to stimuli). See page 2/paragraphs 14-16 of Fodor.
  6. Fodor specifically claims that the form of identity theory called type physicalism is not a plausible doctrine because, he claims,:
    it rules out the possibility of anything having a mental state that does not have neurophysiological states (e.g. Martians or machines). See page 4/paragraph 27.
Card Set
Quiz 15
Quiz 15