Human nature Unit 2

• -intrinsic value (unconditional, non-derivative)
• -should never be treated as merely as means to an end (non-exploitation clause)
• -non-interchangeable and non-replaceable
• -bearers of rights and entitlements

what accounts for the numerical sameness of a person existing at some time in the past and a person existing now

"x and y" are numerically identical = df "x=y"

"x and y are qualitatively identical" = df "x is indistinguishable in appearance from y"

senses provide the primary basis for knowledge claims, introspective experience also provides a basis for knowledge

• "person" = df "rational, self-conscious being", not every human is a person; non-human animals aren't persons
• "x at t2 remembers having experiences that x at t1 actually had"

Person who wakes up in palace is really the cobbler because he remembers cobbler's experiences (human is still prince) and vice versa

• person = non-material soul
• Descartes doesn't care about memories
• rejected by Locke (based on experience)
• Tabula Rasa Theory = intellect at birth is a blank slate

• person = brain
• Locke rejects because consciousness is not reduecable to brain states

Personal Identity requires continued uninterrupted existence over time, perfect identity

Does not admit degrees; questions about truth values of statements of the form "x is numerically identical with y" require strict yes/no answers (personal identity)

admits of degrees; questions about the truth values of the statements of the form "x is numerically identical with y" do not have strict yes/no answers (physical object identity) --> replacing parts (not Reid/Locke)

possibility of intelligent beings to be the same if consciousness transmigrates bodies, absurd that many humans can be the same person --> Locke's theory on personal identity is implausible

possible to be many persons, absurd to suppose one human could be many persons --> implausible theory

old general doesn't remember childhood (not same person) but does remember middle age (which remembers childhood) --> same person; Locke accepts Transitivity of Numerical Identity Principle (A=B, B=C --> A=C) so general MUST be same person as child --> Locke gives two incompatible answers but can only have one due to the principle

Personal Identity is grounded in a continuous and stable substratum, memory/consciousness is always changing --> personal identity can't be grounded in memory

"x is logically possible" = df "x can be conceived or thought or imagined in a non-contradictory way"

"x is materially possible" = df "x is compatible with known physical laws" (scientifically possible)

• determined by bodily continuity
• KB is annihilated and can never exist again, a qualitatively identical KB might exist after destruction of original KB but it would not be numerically identical with original KB

Person consists of an unobservable soul contained in observable material, observation of same body --> infer same soul

can't be established since soul is unobservable --> can't be a known posterior; soul definition doesn't entail that it remains with same body (logically impossible to separate) --> can't be a known priori and it's groundless; judgements about personal identity are not groundless --> can't be used to establish judgements

• knowledge following an observation
• knowledge before and independent of experience/observation

soul is basis for psychological continuity, directly observable via introspection and indirectly by behavioral regularities --> soul is directly observable via introspection and behavioral regularity observations

what I observe via introspection are psychological states, not observing ground for states --> psychological continuity could be grounded in more than one soul over time and change, no reason to believe one soul serves ground of psychological continuity

psychological states are indirectly observable via observation of behavioral regularities, if soul exists, then two or more souls could contain similar psychological states --> observable behavioral regularities could be product of multiple souls existing consecutively in same body, observing regularities isn't evidence of one soul continuing to exist in a body, does not provide warrant to conclude soul is basis of personal identity

Personal Identity is based on real memories of the past, to establish it's real is to show that memories are caused by actual past experiences, to show this it's necessary to prove same person with memories experienced it --> only legitimate if personal identity has been established, real memory can't be used in a non-circular way

• Personal identity = brain continuity, having the same brain
• Merry Beaudine (dies, brain transplant with Julia North)

at death, person ceases to exist, brought back into existence that is psychologically and physically indistinguishable --> numerically identical

suppose GW2 is a psychological and physical duplicate of God's, and GW2 is brought into being after GW1's death. Any reason to believe higher being can create GW2 means it can make GW3. GW2 = GW1 --> GW1=GW3 but then GW2=GW3 --> absurd (personal identity is 1:1, no personal fission) --> GW2 is only qualitatively, not numerically, identical so theory is false

• Hamlet (duplicate of original brain), Dennett can survive loss os his body, therefore his personal identity is not associated with his body
• brain survived in a sense

• Dennett experiences bodily states (when a brain is hooked up to a body), a disembodied brain in a vat cannot have the experiences
• therefore Dennett does not equal his brain

• a person's consciousness/memories/perspective can change
• personal identity does not change
• therefore Dennett does not equal his consciousness, memories, and perspective

• based on practical human concerns (marriage, property rights, legal and moral obligations) personal identity is a 1:1 relation
• if personal fission is possible, then one person can become two, which would undermine normal human legal and social conventions
• personal fission is impossible

• any cognitive data processing system that is functionally isomorphic with the human brain is conscious and counts as being a person
• any reason for claiming that A is a person is a good reason for claiming that B is a person
• functionalist analysis is plausible

Can tell what a candy is by the swirl on top, know what's inside, but can't bite into a soul