POLI SCI - Alliances / Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation

  1. What are OMLET's, why are they useful? where did they use them?

    what did differences did this show between the forces of Canada, France, and Germany?
    What does this mean about how the costs are shared?
    • - Observer Mentor Liason Teams - a unit of foreigners placed in a military unit to observe, mentor and liason.
    • - useful for comparing how countries are operating
    • - NATO in afghanistan - to make sure the forces are working effectively

    • - Canada is unrestricted (now) - they can go with the Kandak's (afghan forces) wherever
    • - France: requires a phonecall home to Elysée (prez) --> leads to significant delays
    • - Germany - restricted, cant move out of RC-North

    uneven costs - the price payed in blood uneven (US pays the most, and its allies pay more)
  2. NATO Article V, but what is the loophole?

    Ultimately what does this determine about risks and costs
    • - says that an attack upon one is an attack upon all
    • - BUT each country determines what exactly they will do --> they still have the ability to opt out (the relevant actors are not necessarily in Brussels (NATO headquarters) - depends on who wants to help)

    Ultimately there is a variation in risks and costs
  3. Caveats

    - limits what?
    • - says what each country can and cannot do (varying levels of discretion)
    • - both formal and informal

    • limits:
    • - what commanders can do on the ground (do they need to phone home?)
    • - areas of operation (cant leave specific places)
    • - who a contingent can work with
    • - whether or not they can go out at night
    • - if they can perform offensive operations or not

  4. What, besides caveats, might limit what a contingent can do on the gound
    • - the capability of the mother country
    • - how one interprets caveats
  5. Applying Caveats to Interactions, Interests, and Institutions
    Interactions: collective goods? prisoners dilemma happens a lot, but the stakes are usually uneven - why are some countries more involved than others

    Interests: public opinion - if there is low public support for a war/conflict then there is more likely to be tighter restrictions. More dangerous places also usually have tight restrictions

    • Institutions: who makes decisions about rules governing deployment
    • - if there are multiple actors, more likely to be compromise (caveats).
    • - Less enthusiastic actors --> more caveats
    • - Contingent gov'ts (many ppl) - more likely to have restrictions (except Danes and Canadians)
    • - if single actor (prez, single party parlaiment), depends more on their personality - change is more likely
  6. How do countries work with caveats today?
    - work with old partners : Canada - UK, Dutch, US; Danes - UK, Italy doesnt do anything?

    - creative force allocation (put the germans where they can help, not fire)

    - use special operations units (not restricted)

    - scenario scheming?

    - rely on less caveated contingents
  7. War strategy with WWII and conventional bombing; does this change with the development of Atomic Weapons?
    • WWII/Conventional Bombing
    • - create more massive bombs and technology increases
    • - this escalates over time: knock out enemy force / morale --> wipe out civilians in mass numbers to make it more painful to fight
    • No. This is the same with Atomic weapons, now weapons are just bigger and more efficient --> end the war quicker by inflicting extreme pain on an opponent
  8. The Nuclear Era - characterized by massive retaliation

    what was the problem with this in terms of the Soviet Union after WWII?

    what is one of the major problems with nuclear weapons in general?
    - in the event of war, immediately launch a massive atomic attack

    The Soviet Union had the conventional military advantage in Western Europe (many more troops) so the west develops nuclear bombs to balance

    The problem is that nuclear bombs have enormous first strike advantage
  9. How did nuclear weapons escalate in the 1950's
    • - size of weapons (bigger --> hydrogen fusion)
    • - number of weapons
    • - delivery system to drop bombs (all a leader has to do is push a button that is brought to him)
  10. MAD

    - speed and scale of destruction
    mutually assured destruction

    - HUGE - can destroy a whole country in minutes
  11. How does MAD change with Survivable Second Strike Capacity

    What methods does this produce (?)
    - redundence
    - rapid launch
    - Nuclear Submarines
    - 1st strike advantage doesnt apply any more

    • Methods
    • - redundence: the more you build, the more weapons will survive. But the more enemies you have, the more ppl will want to take you out --> just keep producing
    • - missiles with rapid launch - fire back and forth at eachother (?)
    • - Nuclear Submarines: - survive the first attack and then wipe out an opponent

    But ultimately both sides would be wiped out
  12. Strategic Effects of MAD
    • - Mutual Deterrence: may keep peace (dont start war because both sides will lose)
    • - dont need to win to destroy (its insane to even think of starting war) (?)
    • - goals shift from winning war to avoiding war
  13. Criticism of MAD
    • - there may be a "winnable" nuclear war if you're looking at degrees of destruction - the less destroyed is the winner
    • - but that is fucking sick and perverted, (mad) - accidents may happen where you destroy the whole world. Even having weapons risks too much
    • - problems of control
    • - need for cooperation
  14. But can you credibly threaten to use nukes?
    • - not really --> deterrence might not work
    • - stability-instability paradox?? - we wont use nukes but are stable underneath?

    - you can limit conventional war, but you cant really limit nuclear wars - cant say that it wont escalate beyond cities (cant make credible threats as to bombing cities)
  15. extended deterrence
    - if you attack our ally, we will attack you. but are you really willing to sacrifice your cities for your allies cities?

    but this leaves something to chance - if you attack our ally, things will go wrong for you
  16. The problems of defense with mutually assured destruction
    - defense may now be even moe dangerious
  17. Various Attempts at Missile Defense
    Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) - makes each side more vulnerable (get rid of missiles)

    Strategic Defense Initiative (1980's) - US trying to develop a way to shoot missiles out of the sky - but this made the USSR more suspicious if the technology ever worked --> earth is more dangerous
  18. Non-Proliferation Treaty
    • -limits nuclear weapons to the 5 current nuclear states - USA, USSR, UK, China, France
    • - those that do have are committed to disarmament
    • - right to civilian nuclear power (energy) - but enriched uranium can also be used for nuclear weapons
  19. What are the pros and cons of more countries having nuclear weapons
    • pro's
    • - force leaders to behave responsibly (if you use, you will be destroyed)

    • cons
    • - more sources of error
    • - rougue general - control of nukes could fall into the wrong hands
    • - not all countries are cooperative
    • - nations may be aggressive, irrational ... Iran?
    • - could get into the hands of terrorists
  20. What can be done to stop the spread of nuclear weapons
    • - strike first? - but that could backfire
    • - offer guarantees and moniter
  21. in the long run, why may it be impossible to stop the spread of nukes to Iran
    • - because nuclear technology is spreading
    • - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the enrichment of Uranium and separation of plutonium
    • - uranium enrichment facilities could be underground (Israel sent an air strike on nuclear power plants in 1981, but no luck)
  22. What is the most preferable option for stopping Iran from getting the bomb

    imposing economic sanctions through the UN security council

    this only increases the costs of going nuclear, does not reduce the ability of the government to get them, as seen by India and Pakistan in the 1980's and 90's
  23. what lesson we learned from the history of nonproliferation - when does it succeed
    when the US and other global actors satisfy concerns that drove a state to want nukes in the first place
  24. why do states want nuclear weapons

    why does Iran in particular want them?
    • - protect against an external security threat
    • - satisfy interests of domestic actors
    • - acquire status symbol

    • Iran
    • - protection (sits in unstable region - aggressive Iraq)
    • - stand up to US demands for regime change in Iran
  25. The problems of proliferation:
    only guarantees a very precarious peace - there is nothing to make sure that states keep their promises to disarm ex: Japan
  26. Why should the US avoid a military strike on Iran
    • - they would expose themselves and their allies to severe retaliation
    • - Iran might also support terrorist groups in Europe or the US
  27. Why cant we use Lybia (2003) as an example of how to deal with Iran?
    because Iran has a security issue as well

    2003: Lybian president gave up the pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for and end to economic sanctions and positive economic incentives

    Therefore, US should offer security measures to Iran sooner rather than later

    US didnt keep their promise to North Korea (construction of light-water reactors and normalizing relations) if they dismantle their reactors

    SO, they have to keep their promises and maintain credible threats that it will impose sanctions or even limited force agains Iran if it violates commitments
Card Set
POLI SCI - Alliances / Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation
How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, Nuclear Stability in South Asia, A Nuclear Armed Iran