Manslaughter

This is dealt with in S5 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861.

There are two main categories of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. There are three types of each.

Voluntary manslaughter is when both the actus reus and the mens rea for murder are present, but the accused successfully raises the defence of self-defence, provocation or diminished responsibility, resulting in the reduction of the charge to manslaughter.

Involuntary manslaughter is when the accused didn't have the necessary mens rea for murder, ie intention to kill or cause serious injury.

The three types of voluntary manslaughter are: 

1) where a killing arises out of provocation; 

2) where the accused was operating under diminished responsibility when the murder was carried out; 

3) where the accused killed in self-defence, using more force than was reasonably necessary but no more force than he believed to be reasonably necessary.

These align with the defences mentioned previously. Absent the above circumstances, the accused would be convicted with murder.

The three types of involuntary manslaughter are: 

1) Assault manslaughter: where the accused assaulted the victim with the intention to cause harm. 

2) Criminal and dangerous act manslaughter: where an accused commits a crime thereby causing someone's death, and where (a) the crime was objectively dangerous; and (b) he intended to commit the crime. 

3) Criminal negligence manslaughter: where the accused failed to discharge a duty of care, resulting in the death of another.

Note: since assault is the crime that most often causes death, assault manslaughter and criminal and dangerous act manslaughter often overlap.

The harm need only be minor; if it were intent to cause serious harm, we'd be talking about murder. However, 'minor' should be understood as 'less than serious, but more than trivial'. 

In R v Holzer (1968), Holzer had punched a man, causing him to fall and bang his head on the ground, killing him. The evidence indicated that Holzer had intended merely to bruise or cut the man's lip. Smith J said: "The intended injury need not be a serious injury. Indeed, if it was a serious injury that was intended we would be in the field of murder, not manslaughter. The injury intended may be of a minor character but it must not be merely trivial or negligible."  

In R v Wild (1837), a guest of Wild had outstayed his welcome. In trying to make him leave, Wild gave him a kick that resulted in his death. Wild had not intended any serious harm to come to the guest, but as he had intended minor harm, and the action could not be justified, his conviction of manslaughter was upheld.

Potentially; S18 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 provides that a person can use force to protect his property from appropriation, destruction or damage by a trespasser.

Yes; in DPP v Daley and McGhie (1980), the defendants chased the victims and threw stones at him. In attempting to escape, the victim tripped and fell, and he was subsequently found dead. The act of throwing stones in this case was held to amount to assault, even though it was unclear whether any stones actually struck him.

The objective nature of the danger in criminal and dangerous act manslaughter was explained by Smith J in R v Holzer (1968): "The circumstances must be such that any reasonable man in the accused's position, performing the very act that the accused performed, would have realised that he was exposing another or others to an appreciable risk of really serious injury. it is not sufficient to show that there was a risk of some harm resulting; it must be serious harm."

The mens rea of criminal and dangerous act manslaughter is intention to commit the crime in question. This was spelled out by Smith J in R v Holzer (1968).

These requirements are summarised in the Irish case of The People (AG) v Crosbie and Meehan (1966). In this case, Crosbie had stabbed the deceased during a brawl in a crowded room. Crosbie said he had been assailed by two or three men and so he had pulled out a knife to scare them off.

Henchy J held that the brandishing of a knife was unlawful because it was done to intimidate and not for self-defence, and added that the dangerous quality of the act must be judged by objective standards; it wasn't relevant that Crosbie didn't think it was dangerous. 

In Crosbie, the Court of Criminal Appeal approved the formulation in the English case of R v Larkin (1943): "The relevant intention… is the deliberate doing of an act which is unlawful and which, judged by objective standards, is dangerous." 

(In Larkin, the defendant had threatened a love rival with a razor. Their mutual love interest, who was drunk, swayed against the razor, and it cut her throat, killing her.)

The Irish case of The People (DPP) v Hendley (1993) reaffirmed the rule in Crosbie that the act had to be both unlawful and dangerous. In this case, Hendley was engaged with an altercation with his wife, during which he knelt on her while gripping her neck. The act of kneeling on her put pressure on her liver, causing her death. The trial judge had directed the jury that it was enough to prove Hendley had engaged in an unlawful act, but the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that this was not enough; they also had to prove the act was dangerous and deliberate.

Yes; in The People (DPP) v Horgan (2007), Horgan held a woman in an armlock as he was raping her; this compressed the victim's neck, precipitating cardiac arrest and death. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that this constituted unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter.

The standard for negligence is much higher than the civil standard. As a result, convictions for this type of manslaughter are extremely rare. 

This arose for consideration in The People (AG) v Dunleavy (1948). Dunleavy was a taxi driver who knocked down and killed a cyclist. The evidence showed that the cyclist had been within a few feet of the kerb at the time, and Dunleavy's negligence consisted of driving too close to the kerb, and with no lights on at night. 

In quashing his conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeal decided that in illustrating the concept of gross negligence to the jury, a reference to recklessness would be misleading; it was better to relate the negligence to the risk of harm to others. 

Davitt J held that an accused is guilty of criminal negligence manslaughter where: 

• a) he has failed to observe such course of conduct as experience shows to be necessary if, in the circumstances, the risk of injury to others it to be avoided (ie, in this case, failing to behave as a reasonable driver would). This is an objective test; it is irrelevant whether the accused himself appreciated the risk; 
• b) the negligence on the part of the accused was responsible for the death (causation);
• c) the negligence was of a high degree; 
• d) the negligence was such as to involve, in a high degree, the risk or likelihood of substantial personal injury to others. It must go beyond ordinary carelessness.

–> objective test; causation; high degree of negligence involving risk of substantial injury

Yes; there's no reason in principle why they shouldn't be given to juries in all trials for criminal-negligence manslaughter. 

Note: English criminal law does distinguish between these two types of manslaughter.

Several notable English cases deal with vehicular manslaughter. In R v Lawrence (1982), a motorcyclist collided with and killed a pedestrian. The House of Lords held that the test of recklessness was the same for reckless driving as in a case of criminal damage, as set out in Caldwell (1982): a person acts recklessly if he takes an obvious risk and either (a) gives no thought to the possibility of such a risk, or (b) recognises the risk, but nevertheless takes it. However, in Lawrence the word 'serious' was added: "an obvious and serious risk".

This was upheld in R v Seymour (1983), in which a man had an argument with his girlfriend and tried to push her car with his truck, but crushed her and killed her.

In R v Prentice, Adomako and Holloway (1993), it was held that cases of vehicular manslaughter would be bound by Seymour, while other cases of criminal negligence should follow a different test.

However, in light of R v G (2003), which abolished the Caldwell test, it's unclear if Lawrence and Seymour have been overruled entirely.

(More on these cases in other sections. Caldwell = hotel fire case; R v G = boys who set newspapers on fire, caused £1million in damage)

Prentice was a junior doctor who made an injection into the spine instead of the arm, killing the patient.

Adomako was an anaesthetist in charge of a patient during an eye operation; he failed to notice an oxygen pipe had become disconnected, and the patient died.

Holloway was an electrician whose client died of electric shock following negligently performed electrical work.

It was held that the ingredients of this type of manslaughter were: the existence of a duty; a breach of the duty causing death; and gross negligence that the jury finds justifies a criminal conviction. 

Lord Taylor CJ , while not purporting to give an exhaustive definition, held that proof of any one of the following four states of mind in the defendant might properly lead a jury to make a finding of that third ingredient, gross negligence: 

• a) indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health; 
• b) actual foresight of the risk coupled with a determination to run it nevertheless; 
• c) an appreciation of the risk coupled with an intention to avoid it but also with such a high degree of negligence in the attempted avoidance as the jury considered justified conviction; 
• d) inattention or failure to advert to a serious risk that goes beyond 'mere inadvertence' in respect of an obvious and important matter that the defendant's duty demanded he should address.

In The People (DPP) v Cullagh (1999), Cullagh was the operator of a chairoplane at a funfair. He had bought the chairoplane after it had been left in an open field for three years, and was aware of its decrepit state when he bought it, though he did attempt to repair it. One of the seats became detached while the ride was operating, resulting in a fatality. Cullagh appealed his conviction without success.

The penalties for manslaughter range from a fine to life imprisonment. Life imprisonment is rarely applied and is normally reserved for the worse variations of manslaughter.

For those who cause death on the roads, the standard of negligence established in The People (AG) v Dunleavy (1948) is difficult to prove. However, there is an offence known as 'death by dangerous driving', where the standard of negligence is much lower. Accordingly, the maximum punishment is also lower: up to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 euro.

S53 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 makes it an offence to drive a vehicle in a public place at a speed or in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the relevant circumstances (including road conditions and traffic volume).

This is punishable by up to six months' imprisonment and a fine.

In The People (AG) v Quinlan, O'Brien J defined dangerous driving as driving in a manner that a "reasonably prudent motorist", having regard to all the circumstances, would clearly recognise as involving a direct, immediate and serious risk of harm to the public.

No, driving within the speed limit is not a defence.