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1910
- Korea annexed by Japan
- Japan retained control throughout ww2
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late 1940s
- cold war goes global
- moves from just europe
- korean war marks beginning of this period
- similar pattern to germany - division of country
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1945
- japan defeated in ww2 - under american occupation
- japanese forced out of territories they were dominating
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post ww2 korea
- under occupation longer than just ww2 - no colonizers could be legitimized to gain control
- would be given full independence after war (agreed at wartime conference)
- military presence of both us and ussr - aim of overseeing demilitarization of japanese forces
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initial division of korea
- due to practical reasons
- korean nationalists (led revolution in 1945) allowed to decide fate of korea after ww2
- us and ussr would repatriate japanese forces - division over 38th parallel (only in administration)
- temporary arrangement originally
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council of foreign ministers' moscow conference
- 1945
- us and ussr agreed on creation of korean provisional government
- followed by short period of international trusteeship/supervision
- eventual independence
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difficulties of temporary division
- cold war developed - less willingness to cooperate between us and ussr
- separate administrations
- leaders in control of sectors both wished to unite korea
- south: syngman rhee (us support, democratic korea)
- north: kim il sung (strong comunist leader, role in chinese civil war, grew up in ussr, role in pushing out japanese) - communist agenda, influenced by china, forced mao and through him stalin to support him
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1947
- division becomes confirmed
- americans persuaded un to establish commission to supervise korean elections
- commission refused entry in north
- observed elections in south in may 1948
- most koreans opposed partition
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1948
soviet troops left north korea
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may 1948
- creation of republic of korea (rok) under sungman rhee
- undemocratic and anti-communist administration
- recognized by un (legitimate)
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september 1948
- creation of democratic people's republic of korea (dprk) under kim il sung
- recognized by communist bloc but not un (illegitimate)
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1949 - 1950
- response of us to division: sent rhee economic and military aid
- did not intend to station troops in rok - us military left by mid-1949
- offshore strong points from japan to philippines
- dean acheson's 'perimeter' speech excluded south korea and taiwan from american defensive perimeter in western pacific
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september 1949
- ussr gets atomic bomb
- us relied on their atomic bomb, demobilized fighting men in europe - now no longer had full monopoly
- equalized power balance in terms of military capacity
- us reacted with fear, uncertainty, threat, attempts to regain monopoly - recognition of ussr as a real superpower
- start of arm race
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december 1949
- communist victory in chinese civil war
- during war us gave limited support to nationalists
- nationalist forces fell to communist guerrilla forces of mao zedong
- us recognized communist china was not directly connected to moscow (white paper)
- people's republic of china
- 3rd key actor in cold war
- us feared danger of communism
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1950s
- anti-communism in us reaches fever pitch - 'red scare'
- encouraged by senator joseph r mccarthy of wisconsin - stated ussr had conspiracy to place communist sympathizers into key positions in american life
- accusations led to purges and show trials
- anti-red cruesade shaped and intensified public opinion against communism - near-hysterical suspicion and fear of enemy within, mccarthy called for purge of comsymps in state department
- claims that truman administration was under communist influence and all american liberals were communist sympathizers
- dean acheson speech: appeasing mccarthyites, claimed china under mao was completely subservient to moscow regime - reverse to what White Paper stated prior to speech, resulted in firing of two state department advisers on china (loss of valuable experts on far east foreign affairs)
- truman refused to recognize legitimacy of new chinese government
- direct effect on intervention of us in korea
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april 1950
- us national security council produces nsc-68
- report warned all communist activity everywhere could be traced to moscow
- recent develpments had global theme - indicated growing strength and influence of ussr
- monolithic view of communism - all communism was the same to the us
- warning of indefinite period of tension and danger
- advice to us government to be ready to meet all challenges promptly - suggestion of immediate increase of military strength worth 35-50 billion dollars
- key significance: encouragment of military and economic aid to be given to any country by the us to resist comunism
- us committing to globally intervene in any issue they see to be under influence of communism
- revisionist view: perceptions based on false premise, excuse for us expansionism
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25 june 1950
- north korea invades south korea
- 90 000 north korean soldiers launched invasion (massive tank attack)
- proxy war
- initial push took them deep into south korea, only pusan not under control (south korean and american troops were located there)
-
us response to invasion
- upcoming congressional elections in novemeber - truman wanted to push off commitment in asia, nsc-68, recognition of china until post-elections
- invasion made that impossible
- seen as example of soviet expansionism and aggression by communism
- if korea fell to communism it would be easier for it to spread to japan
- fear that failure to take action would undermine us credibility in determination to resist communism and encourage domino effect in neighbouring states
- response dictated by containment
- initially sending aid
- us sponsored resolution in un - test for the un in terms of league of nations' mistake of ignoring invasion
- ussr boycotting security council in protest of refusal of us to allow communist china a seat - resolution passed
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27 june 1950
un resolution passed
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1 july 1950
- us troops arrive in korea
- joined by 15 other nations under a un commander general douglas macarthur
-
superpower involvement
- orthodox historians: it was an attack initiated and led by stalin
- revisionist historians: stalin had no role in invasion, north was possibly responding to attacks from the south
- bruce cumings (1981) stated soviet control over dprk was flimsy - not reliant on soviet arms
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role of kim il sung
- both leaders wanted unified country - civil war would happen regardless
- involvement of superpowers necessary for success - both sides unable to defeat the other
- effort to convince stalin to back attack (impetus for war came from pyongyang)
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role of stalin
- gave approval for kim's plans at beginning of 1950
- changed his minde due to: hope for chances of world revolution - wanted soviet influence in asia, us was turning japan into anti-communist base so gaining control over korea would secure soviet position in northeast asia
- john lewis gaddis - stalin's opportunism and tendency to advance himself where he thought it wouldn't provoke strong response (acheson's speech provided opportunity)
- stalin was cautious, wouldn't provide great assistance and support
- kim had to gain mao's approval
- soviet command involved in preparation and execution of attack
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role of mao zedong
- initial scepticism
- approval granted due to impression of stalin's enthusiasm
- mao was planning invasion of taiwan - needed soviet support
- kim denied mao's offer of troops
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September 1950
- us troops land at inchon
- led by general macarthur
- amphibious landing in order to bypass korean troops and cut them off
- within a month they retook seoul, drove north koreans back to 38th parallels
- decision to focus on policy of 'roll-back' rather than containment - wanted liberation of north koreans from communist rule, reuniting of korea
- un forces crossed 38th parallel, began advance northwards - captured pyongyang in october
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27 november 1950
- chinese launch counter-offensive
- march towards yalu river made china concerned about its safety
- 200k chinese joined 150k koreans
- pyeongyang recaptured in december
- retook land up to 38th parallel
- heavy american casualties (cold), many taken prisoner
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december 1950
- un troops fall back to 38th parallel
- stalemate around parallel
- truman realized us had to return to containment above parallel - macarthur disagreed, was relieved of command
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february 1951
un condemns china as aggressor in korea
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april 1951
eisenhower dismisses macarthur
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july 1951
- truce talks start in korea
- focus on repatriation of prisoners of war
- war continues for another 2 years
- serious casualties (over 40% of american casualties in this period)
- us pressure on china by threatening with atomic weapons
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september 1951
us and japan sign mutual security pact
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october 1951
greece and turkey join nato
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march 1952
ussr proposes neutral germany
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november 1952
eisenhower elected as president
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march 1953
death of stalin
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july 1953
- military armistice to end korean hostilities signed at Panmunjom by north
- south did not sign
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role of us and ussr similarities
- arrival in korea by accident
- aim to unify the country
- left behind ideological conflict (administration)
- no nuclear warfare
- direct confrontation (pilots)
-
role of us and ussr differences
- us denied aid, ussr provided aid
- ussr kept the war going longer, us sponsored peace talks
-
no nuclear war reasons
- Limited war
- Proved there could be a conflict in which both sides have nuclear weapons but do not use them
- No targets of important infrastructure in Korea
- Did not bomb China due to political costs - vulnerability of NATO countries
-
ussr drew out war
- despite acceptance of stalemate
- study of contemporary warfare for Chinese
- shaking up Truman regime
- harming Anglo-American military prestige
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why ussr agreed to aid
- believed war could be fought through proxies
- americans would not respond
- kim assured the war would be quick
- maintaining momentum created by mao
- compensation for setbacks in europe
- direct soviet involvement not required - reliance on the chinese
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1956
khrushchev takes leadership of ussr
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political impact on south korea
- citizens against division - massive rallies
- state built up quickly due to lack of powerful interests
- Collapse of Rhee oligarchy
- Armed forces remained in dispute due to electoral fraud
- Military was behaving as neutral but kept down left-wing organizations
- US assistance -
Bypassing consulting subjects and seeking consent, Central state authority, Troops present after the war - Coercive capacity grew from 100,000 armed force to 600,000
- Series of US-backed military dictators
- Developmental state made and organized capitalists
- Postponement of democracy until the communist threat was gone
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Political impact on North Korea
- Communist country with ideology of Juche – literally subject – which puts emphasis on self-reliance as foundation for an independent North Korea
- Not much bearing on policy making or people’s lives
- Justification for policies that served to politically isolate regime
- Single political focus infused in all aspects of life
- Ending direct Soviet political control
- Imposing of political control as the self-actualized centre by Kim – not a peripheral power dependent on the Communist bloc
- Defeat of internal rivals by Kim (three other factions) – monopoly of power
- Reorganization of Korea Workers’ Party – preventive measure for civil uprisings and dissent
Purges within the party - Building of mass party – would include peasants, poor working-class citizens
- Foreign policy:
USSR and China: Lack of war support caused de-Stalinization and political distance, Dependent on military aid – US troops were an excuse for more assistance, Attempt to reconstruct a relationship that would maximize Kim’s autonomy and flexibility – easier due to rift in Sino-soviet relationship, Struggle to avoid political influences over North Korea and its affairs
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Socio-economic impact
- 4 million casualties - 3 million Koreans, 1 million Chinese, 40,000 US/UN
- 1:100 ratio men to women
Many widows - Limited war in international perspective, Total war in Korean perspective (
All parties are involved, - All available means are used for the war effort (propaganda, economy))
- Mass displacement (cca 2 million people)
Border separated families - Orphans, widows
- Refugees (3 million people)
- Intermarriage between Korean women and American soldiers
- Rapid urbanization
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