IR 584 Midterm

  1. AU Headquarter
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
  2. Military base in Africa
    Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti
  3. Newest Country
    South Sudan
  4. Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
    Clinton initiative, BUsh 43 expanded
  5. Sub Sahara is
    all of the countries south of the ones that border on teh Mediterranean Sea; AU includes all countries except Morocco; cultural difference between sub-sahara and North Africa

    • Made up of 48 countries...has 973 million people as of 2014; collective GDP 1.729 trillion dollars
    • India looks little closer to Afric
    • Africa has lowest life expectancy of any region (58 yrs) 
    • has largest percentage of people living with HIV/AIDS, and some very scary diseases like Ebola are indelibly linked with Africa 


    • BUT
    • growth rates in 2014 were healthy 4.5%
    • middle class and world trade gorwing
    • has one of highest cell penetration rates
    • (business as attraction)
  6. US Gov interacts w/Afric
    State Department divides responsibilities for relations with Africa between the Bureau of African Affairs; this is mirrored in the way NSC staff is organized; 

    Pentagon gives AFRICOM responsibility for military relations with all Africa except Egypt
  7. Decolonization process
    • did not beign until 1950s or 60s
    • some cases didn't conclude until the 70s 
    • State Dept. didn't create Bureau of Afric. Affairs until 1959
  8. US Interests in Africa
    SEcurity, economic, humanitarian

    Security: Terrorism; Instability, Civil War, Poor Governance, Refugee flows

    Health: HIV/AIDS; Ebola


    • Assumptions behind these interests: 
    • US "responsibility"
    • Global interests as a leader 
    • spillover effects
    • Proper risk assessment


    ECONMIC: source raw materials, oil exports to US way down but stabilizes global price; rare earths for electronics; potential medicinal herbs; Potential market for US goods (food, machinery, aircraft, trucks and autos, 

    HUMANITARIAN: food production and access, education, health care
  9. US had said about our interests
    ensuring security of US citizens; promoting democratic states; expanding opportunities; preventing conflict; fostering broad-based sustainable economic growth;
  10. LYMAN and CFR report (differences?)
  11. UN Nation 1945 creation
    was open to only those independent countries that had declared war on Germany or Japan, so only three subSaharan were there (Liberia, Ethiopia, Union of South Africa)
  12. After WWII
    • After 1946,with first Eastern European communist state est. in Albania in 1959 
    • Anti-colonial movements throughout the Third World attracted to communist ideology 
    • In opening of Cold War, US was hostile to colonialism ---- unsympathetic to British, French, and Dutch desires to reclaim parts empire

    • weren't necessarily pushing for independence though
    • US policy makers had little time left over for Africa
    • Starting with Sudan in 1956 (Won its independence from a combined British/Egyptian condominium) 

    Big burst in 1960  and over next eight years, another 13 joined indpendence 

    • The colonial powers gave up their positions without a miliary fight 
    • there was unrest, but did not come about as result of insurgent movements
    • Congo was different (won its indpendence from Belgium in 1960; within days, troops mutinied against white officers and belgium sent troops to reoccupy the country) 
    • US backed a UN peacekeeping mission (Lumumba frustrated for UN for not getting rid of Belgians, turned to soviets which triggered Eisenhower Admin. moved against Lumumba) 
    • US supported J. Mobutu 



    For many leaders, Communism was attractive because Russia moved froma rural country to one of two superpowers
  13. What inhibited better relations between US/AFrica
    Communism 

    and race relations in the US (until civil rights movement, large pop living under Jim Crow laws ectc) 

    race relation nuanced though -- a lot of Africa n leader studied in US and came away with impression of reality fo racism but ideals of democracy
  14. Portugal's Colonies
    • wars of independence began in 1960s 
    • prob worst of the colonial powers (second to Belgium) 
    • Mozambique--roads run coast to interior = desire to exploit as much of resource as possible with little investment 
    • governors spens enourmous sums to buy positions which could only keep for a year

    US didn't view Africa as a prize in itself but as an indicator of resolve against Soviet expansionism
  15. Africa Communism
    • No effective alternatives to either MPLA victory in Angola or FRELIMO in Mozambique
    • Despite Kissinger's warnings/fears; US policy continued to more or less acquiesce in emergence of two Marxist states in South Africa
  16. Apartheid South Africa
    • Carter adminstration taken a very harsh line against SA
    • put US on the right side, very little changed
    • When Reagan took over, he hoped to keep SA in fight against former colonies and Southwest Africa; "constructive engagement" he followed where US did not overtly criticize South Africa and would not impose sanctions

    Bottom line: Africa was in fact peripheral to core US interests in Cold War
  17. Effects fall of Berlin Wall
    • Effects were almost immediate
    • massive reductino in staffs of Soviet embassies 
    • cutbacks in economic support and military sales
    • major retrenchment and rethinking of Russian interests in Africa 
    • Russians have not changed that since (relatively minor player throughout Africa) 
    • In early days, expectation that superpower competition would be replaced by cooperation and wider scope for UN to take action 
    • That was the case: massive growth in number of UN peacekeeping operations (Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, 
    • President George H.W. Bush talked in terms of creating "NEW WORLD ORDER"


    • Almost all conflict was result of internal strif and civil war, often with no clear aggressors/victims 
    • no clear military path to victory or what victory would look like

    More robust PKO : can use any means to force parties to comply; Somalia collapsed into civil war w/Siad Barre regime collapse  (use of food as weapon)
  18. Presidential Study Directive 13 (PSD-13)
    sets out the issues to be explored (Clinton admin ordered an overall review of US peacekeeping policy...US peacekeeping operations were growing substantially which caused unease in Congress) 

    PSD 13 became PDD-25. 

    • fear of wandering into open-ended mandates
    • the point of PSD adn PDD was to give some sort of structure to the decision making process without preordaining how the US would act in a situation 

    leery of "mission creep" = being asked to start with a small job and then having new tasks assigned in a piecemal uncoordinated manner
  19. Somalia/Rwanda
    • 10th mountain Division under UN command
    • Army Rangers (to capture Aideed) and that mission resulted in loss of 18 rangers
    • Clinton admin scarred by both experience

    US would've had to vote in favor of UN internvention, but didn't want to have to actively support it

    • fear of "slippery slope" of rapidly finding UN force in more trouble, requiring rescue
    • US did not want this
  20. Responsibility to Protect
    move to create because of giant gap in Geneva Convention to create customary international law

    (still living with refugee issue in Congo as Congo civil war rages on)
  21. Virtual Engagement
    US tryign to absolve itself and institution like the UN from anything other than a secondary responsibility from these problems
  22. African Crisis Response Force
    suggest that AFricans create to be a standing force from a handful of nations to deal with crises;  no country wanted to make an undefined commitment of its own troops to fight in are outside national interests

    • Replaced by African Crisis Response Initiative 
    • program to train and equip African militaries for peacekeeping operations 


    • Period between collape Soviet and the attacks fo Sept. 11 started out as high hopes
    • these wars in africa knocked that away quickly
  23. South Africa adn Election
    • peaceful transition to black majority rule in SA; first fully democratic elections there in 1994
    • Clinton Admin tried to reach out, but the SA did not return the attempted embrace 
    • (americans tried claiming partial credit for the change becuase of boycotts/sanctions; the SA recalled teh positive relations that earlier US admin had with apartheid gov)
  24. Millenium Challenge Corporation adn President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)
  25. Bush in OFfice
    • by 2001, Africa seemed to be moving in right direction
    • wars on the continent were winding down 
    • greater prospects for trade and development
  26. AU
    In 2001, turned Organization of African Unity into the African Union to provide the possiblitiy that US among others could deal with a more unified continent
  27. 9/11
    • changed policy
    • made counter-terrorism the center piece of American foreign policy 
    • expanded our presence in Djibouti
    • counter-terrorism programs in teh Sahel
    • expanded peace-keeping training

    Expansion of AGOA, creation of MCC, and establishment of PEPFAR were met generally favorably throughout the continent
  28. Scramble For Africa
    • (based on phenomenon from 1870s through early 20th of Euro struggle for African colonies) 
    • Often said there is a new scramble for Africa, but for control of natural resources
  29. China's Interests in Africa
    • Evolved dramatically over last 50 years 
    • was largely ideological at start
    • supported Soviets in efforts to promote communism
    • shifted in 1960s to competing with Soviets to provide leading version of communism 
    • using Africa as tool in Cold War struggle

    • Aim of preventing any diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as independent nation or as legitimate government of China
    • not unusual for countries to switch ties/recognition based on aid packages

    • main energies have shifted to economic sphere and search for natural resources (oil, food, rare earths, timber) 
    • Turned to Africa as source for energy in particular 
    • they also buy land for food production 

    impression that US and China were headed for major conflict over access to African Oil (Chinese National Petroleum Co buying up exploration blocks in Sudan etc) 

    The number of crude imports have dropped substantially for US and China 

    Development of frackign turned US into net energy exporter (import more from Canada) 

    For China, chaos in two key suppliers forced them to diversity a bit
  30. African Oil
    For US, even if AFrican oil is not coming to us, it keeps world market price lower 

    low prices also weaken countries like Russia, Iran, Venezuela that use oil proceeds to finance activities not good for US
  31. 2012 Strategy for Africa
    talks about helping them meet their MDF through infrastructure investment 

    IF China is building (roads, rails, ports) no requirement that exports go to china. Market determines.
  32. US/China at odds in AFrica
    • in area of loans, grants, debt relief
    • especially when Chinese offer aid with no strings attached (in terms of financial reform or improvements in human rights) 
    • argument this removes one of the few pieces of leverage we have on despot like Mugabe or Bashir


    Chinese bringing in their own laborers and hire few Africans; then Chinese workers remain in the country as traders adn small business owners

    (enjoy greater goods, also resentment against them)
  33. China as largest low cost supplier and hurting Africa
    • Paul Collier’s “Bottom Billion” argues that China and to a lesser extent India “suck the air” out of Africa’s economic future.
    • Textiles to small manufacture.  Low cost of labor changes, but China and India have large populations to move low cost manufacturing

    compounded by the fractured nature of the African polity, poor infrastructure, inadequate education systems and rampant corruption

    China is actively undercutting the one area where Africa has the competitive edge over nearly every other area on the planet: adventure tourism.  The Chinese demand for rhino horn, ivory and other trophies threatens to destroy wildlife across Africa, and with it a major source of tourism income,
  34. What element is missing from the readings?
    Volition and choice of Africans themselves. At a minimum, all imply that the Africans have very little say in their relationship with the U.S. or with China other than to choose which they wish to deal with. Reality is much more nuanced. In some cases, Chinese market inroads in places like Nigeria and Ghana have been driven by African merchants going to China in search of inexpensive goods to import. It was only after the Africans identified a market that the Chinese recognized it.Moreover, contracts are not forever.
  35. France Relationship
    France made a policy decision that, even as it relinquished its formal control over its former colonies, would try to maintain a position of strong influence, particularly in the military and economic spheres.This has been a consistent French policy for decades

    "epitome of soft power"jQuery110107406636043071291_1490062442551


    France has been willing to intervene militarily on a regular basis


    France has significant influence over the economies of its former colonies through the use of the CFA  franc, the collective name of two currencies used in West Africa:  the West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc (African Financial Community)
  36. CFA
    CFA franc follows the same monetary policies set by the European Central Bank and executed by the Central Bank of West African States and the Bank of Central African States respectively

    two central banks issue currency and hold external reserves on behalf of the entire area (65% of which is in turn held in the Operations Account in Paris). They also extend credit facilities to banks and other financial institutions as well as to the member states’ governments. The convertibility of the CFA franc to the euro is guaranteed by the French Treasury, and the rates are set by the French.


    • provides a stable currency which makes countries more attractive to foriegn investment 
    • facilitates trade

    • pegging CFA to Euro can make CFA articially strong, weakening ability to export
    • the countries within the AFrican Financial Commnity (CFA) have little direct say over these issues
  37. British Relationship
    • British have less direct role on Africa than French
    • Former Brit colonies less dependent on British, stronger economically
    • Blair viewed with some skepticism for self-described role as savior of Africa (rockstar style approach) 

    Subsequent gov have scaled back British commitments in Africa
  38. Portugal Relationship
    • among last to try to reposition itself in former colonies
    • not gov led process so much but commercial
    • businesses returnign to Mozambique and Angola
  39. India
    • building trade links with the continent, especially in East Africa, where population of ethnic South Asians is growing 
    • looking at Africa from a political adn geostrategic viewpoint as much as a commercial and economic one

    • economic ties are critical, especially natural resources 
    • India dependent on imports for over 90 percent supply
    • buying large tracts of farmland

    • Indian Navy increasing its cpabilities as blue water navy, especially in strategic trade routes) 
    • building relations with African militaries

    Seeking diplomatic links (counting on African votes on number ofo issues, including securing a permanent seat on UNSC)
  40. EU and UN
    • on multi-lateral side, two biggest institutions
    • EU is both multilater instit. and conglomeration of individ. countries
    • Near universal presence in Africa through Permanent Missions of European Unions (staffed by diplomats and aid officials) 
    • take "euro" intrests rather than any individual country
    • biggest focus is trade and development. 
    • Also involved democracy promotion and human rights 


    • UN 
    • also present in nearly every country
    • structure resembles bilateral embassy
    • focus on their agency's mission, but can be highly political 

    In conflict situation, will be led by Special Representative of Secretary General
  41. World Bank
    control of major aid programs

    IMF as lender of last resort for gov and its requirements for structural adjustment

    do not come under direction of UN resident coordinator 


    African countries can benefit from competition for resources, lack of dependency on single buyers


    range of interest suggests GROWING MATURITY AND RELEVANCE OF AFRICA ON WORLD STAGE
  42. CHalleng of Africa
    • "Africa" is more of an ideal rather than a political or economic entity
    • countries divided by geography, history, means of gov, economic development, ethnic make up

    national borders determined by outsiders, not by people of these countries
  43. Organization of African Unity
    • 1963 
    • one of first steps in trying to organize Africa as more than just a group of countries 

    • idea behind it was to further the cause of anti-colonialism, including fight against apartheid
    • to unite to increase the power and influence of African countries

    perceived and agreed need for such unity; OAU included every country except Morocco (left when decided to recogn. independence of West Sahara) 

    • anti-colonial fight one fairly quickly except wars in Portuguese colonies 
    • OAU never able to do much about apartheid (rallying point though) 

    • OAU on world stage as a failure
    • limitations structural and philosophical 

    LACK OF CORE COMMON INTERESTS BYEOND ANTI COLONIALISM 

    meant african unity manifested at UN and otehr international conferences but otherwise not in many practical ways

    • KEY LIMITATIONS
    • OAU imposed on itself
    • non-interference in international affairs of other African countries 
    • and INVIOLABILITY OF NATIONAL BORDERS
  44. Principle Non Interference
    • stemmed from three main sources: fear that Europeans would try to reassert their control
    • fear that neighbors would try to stir up ethnic troubles
    • reverance for independence leaders
  45. Involiability of Borders
    reflected a fear of a slippery slope, a domino effect, that changing inherited borders would lead to a never-ending series of secessionist movements
  46. OAU unable to deal with "african problems"
    like brutal and bloody dictatorship of Idi Amin in Ugand, Bokassa in Central African Empire, or Nguema in Guinea

    UNABLE TO ACT AS UNIT

    No mechanisms for dealing with these serious human rights and security issues (no security council, no army, no enforcement mechanisms) 

    adapted/changed circumstances of inviolability for independence of Eritrea 


    OAU had no mechanisms to push for economic integration despite creation of African Economic Commission in 1993 (Abuja treaty)
  47. AU retains the two key principles of the OAU
    non-interference in internal affairs and the inviolability of borders -- but with a major modification. The CA says that members may not intervene in the internal affairs of other African countries, but that the African Union as an institution can do so

    gross violations of human rights, it can take collective action to deal with it.
  48. CA of AU
    Constitutive Act

    CA also includes suspension of membership for non-democratic take over of governments, but not for existing members who came or keep power in such a manner. Has suspended Mali, Burkina Faso and Madagascar after military coups, readmitting only after elected offices restored.


    Originally no equivalent to the UN Security Council: had to have a decision by the 54 member Assembly of the Union (heads of State/Government) which is very unwieldy. In 2003, the AU created the Peace and Security Council, modeled on the UNSC. 15 members on a rotating basis No permanent members, no veto power, AND no coercive power.


    structures of the AU still leave the power directly in the hands of heads of state. Very little delegated powers or independence of action. Also, strict reliance on “geographic equity” as criteria for make up of commissions and committees.
  49. US and OAU/AU
    • relatively little interaction with OAU
    • creation of AU changed  that
    • Since 2009 U.S. has had a Permanent Mission to the AU, separate from the bilateral embassy, headed by ambassador with own staff. Currently headed by Ambassador Mary Beth Leonard, a seasoned Africa hand.Relatively small mission, since we are not members of AU, focused on key interests of U.S. -- peace and security, economic development
  50. Subregional Organizations as way to work through disagreements
    SADC Southern African Development Community, originally designed to unite the Front Line states against apartheid South Africa. Includes all southern Africa and DRC: Dominated by South Africa

    ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States: Dominated by Nigeria

    IGAD: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (East Africa)

    ECOCAS: Economic Community of Central African States AMU: Africa Maghreb Union


    Reliance on sub-regional organizations brings up an interesting conundrum for AU. Can’t do it all alone, so needs sub-regionals. But relying on sub-regionals denies the idea of “one Africa.” Greater success/independence for sub-regionals may provoke centrifugal forces away from greater African integration.
  51. Challenges and Opportunities for US
    Shift from “Non-interference” to “non-indifference” a significant opportunity to work with AU on human rights and conflict. Gives imprimatur of organization on collective events, harder to characterize as neo-colonialism. Adds local expertise to conflicts where we are sorely lacking.
  52. Economic Growth Rates
    • After "lost decades" of 80s adn 90s, remarkably strong
    • GDP growth 2015 was about 4.5% 
    • growth rate is unevenly distributed, it is more hopeful sign
    • Nigeria's growth in 2014 was non-oil sector (diversification) 
    • West Africa grew despite challenges of Ebola
  53. If oil price declines, what accounts for growing economy?
    • Increasing domestic demand from growing middle class
    • economic reform policies undertaken in number of countries designed to make doing business easier
    • driving economies are increase in extractive industries, agriculture, construction, services
    • resilient to sharp fall in commodity prices by increasing effienciency/production
    • flow of investments and remittances from abroad helps the continent
    • foreign investment helps, and moves away from almost exclusive focus on mineral resources to consumer goods and services targeting large urban areas
    • IMPORTANCE OF REMITTANCE (account 33% of international financial flows to Afr. since 2000)
    • Remittances rather tha Official Develop. Assist (ODA) = local control of use of funds, no accountability to donors, mainly for small business/personal use; organic growth;
  54. AFrica trading partner
    • China is a major player
    • Europe remains Africa's largest trading partner
    • China overtook teh US as Africa's largest single trading partner in 2009
    • intra-african trade is modest growth
    • World Bank, IMF, and African Develop. Bank all see reasons for optimism in Sub Sahra 

    • violent conflict has receded overall (in comparison to 80s/90s) 
    • Africa benefited from high commodity demand and soaring prices 
    • Govs have adopted better fiscal policies (helped by debt relief)
  55. Challenges for African Economy
    • vulnerable to trends in global economy
    • slower growth in more developed economies also increase pressure on foreign workers in those countries
    • Inflation could send world financial markets tumbling again

    • bigger issue = not yet home to higher quality manufacturers (little sub assembly) 
    • faces stiff competition from other potential manufacturers
  56. economic development policies that focus only on urban areas are not likely to be sufficient
    Africa so far has not been accompanied by industrialization, as it was in so many other parts of the world.

    opportunity to experiment with smaller scale sustainable energy development, such as solar and wind, again because the industrial era infrastructure was never built
  57. US foreign aid in Africa
    accounts for about 1 percent of the federal budget

    normal operating budgets of State and USAID, covering salaries, travel, embassy maintenance and security, rents, vehicles, office supplies, etc

    U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is a sub-cabinet agency.  The Director of USAID reports to the Secretary of State, but USAID is not part of the State Department.  It has its own line items within the Foreign Affairs Budget, its personnel systems are different
  58. rationales for promoting foreign assistance
    promote national security.  At first, economic and security assistance were designed to bolster anti-communist governments

     second purpose has not changed much at all: to advance the commercial interests of the United States.

    humanitarian aid to ease human suffering, particularly in the face of natural or man-made disasters.

  59. three basic categories of assistance
    bilateral economic, international security, and multilateral economic assistance
  60. Bilateral economic
    • largest of the three categories
    • further broken down into a number of initiatives, the largest of which include:
    • Global Health (administered both by State and USAID): This includes PEPFAR, child and maternal health, vaccination campaigns, health infrastructure improvement, malaria, TB, tropical diseases.
    • Development Assistance: includes some infrastructure (roads, ports, bridges) but more goes to training, technical advice, governance and human rights improvements, support for civil society.
    • International Disaster Assistance: administration is proposing a major shift in the way we provide emergency assistance, especially food assistance (Food for Peace)  
    • Economic Support Funds (ESF): administered by USAID, decisions made by State.  Funding goes to governments we consider important, primarily on national security grounds, not necessarily to those most in need.  
    • Migration and Refugee Assistance: Food, shelter, medicine for refugees and displaced persons.
    •  The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)  Independent agency, funds projects proposed by, run by, accounted for by recipients. Very small staff.  Have to meet criteria like good governance, low corruption, transparency, respect for human rights, good pro-free market policies. Worthy experiment in a different approach to aid.
  61. Multilateral Economic Assistance
    Most of it goes to contributions to various institutions like the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association (both World Bank family members). The rest parceled out to Africa Development Bank, Africa Development Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and similar institutions. Up to roughly $200 million per institution. Clearly, U.S. strongly prefers to donate bilaterally. For one thing, don’t like our funds diffused.  Also, high administrative costs going through UN and others. One critique of foreign aid is that it doesn’t buy us friends, and that recipients vote against us in the UN. As noted before, not really the prime purpose. More serious critique is that recipients have not really developed, in fact have gone backwards in many key indicators.
  62. Critique of Aid
    aid generally has not brought development. Dambisa Moyo, former World Bank economist from Zambia, an advocate of radical change: no more grant aid.  Go to real loans, DFI, trade.  Stop subsidizing corrupt regimes and make them accountable.
  63. Health Programs
    biggest health program the U.S. runs in Africa, indeed the world, is the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, known as PEPFAR. And most of PEPFAR’s money is spent in Africa.

    essentially come to be seen as an entitlement, especially by governments.  Cannot use as leverage for other changes we would like to see.

    PEPFAR now funds programs in 27 African countries and three regional programs

    Anti-retroviral treatments (ART), Preventing Mother to Child Transmission (PMTC), Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC), condom use (both male and female), and education
  64. PMTC
    major element of prevention is PMTC, where we try to stop the transmission of HIV from infected mothers to their newborns
  65. VMMC
    VMMC is a relatively new initiative. Studies show that transmission rates among uncircumcised males is much higher than among circumcised.  May be one reason West and North African rates are so much lower, because circumcision for religious reasons is the norm.Need to persuade adult males to be circumcised
  66. ABC (D) campaign
    Abstain before marriage, Be Faithful, Use a Condom – and in case of Lesotho – or DIE
  67. Title II of the Public Law 480, which is known as “Food for Peace.”
    Program has been around for decades, and has stubbornly resisted attempts at reform because of domestic considerations.On its face and in reality, is a very generous program, providing at least $1.6 billion annually in emergency food aid. 

    the bulk of food has to be grown and processed in the U.S. and shipped on U.S. carriers.  This adds enormous cost and time to getting aid to where it was needed
  68. Trade/Investment readings
    Trade/Investment: readings demonstrate low rate of penetration of Africa by American firms.  Lack of Dual Trade Treaties and Bilateral Investment Treaties one valid criticism.  Interesting observation that problem is not lack of reward but high relative risk.
  69. Problems with infrastructure highlighted during response to 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa
    Prior had been in remote rural areas, easier to contain.U.S. responded with material, monetary and personnel resources, building 15 Ebola treatment centers, sending 40 metric tons of PPE

    • construction centers came late
    • “brain drain” of medical professionals from Africa


    • Millennium Challenge Account and Corporation (MCA and MCC)Another initiative of the Bush Administration, representing a response to Millennium Development Goals of UN and a different approach to development assistance
    • USG funds infrastructure projects in host countries
    • projects have to be designed, implemented and monitored by the host country
  70. Humanitarian Disaster
    Somalia: severe drought exacerbated by attacks from al-Shabob. Looks like early 1990s all over Nigeria: hundreds of thousands displaced by Boko Haram South Sudan civil war displaced hundreds of thousands Yemen: Saudi bombing campaign UN requesting $4.4 billion by March to avert catastrophe. Received only a small amount of that so far.Last famine in
  71. International Security Assistance
    International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR); International Military Education and Training (IMET): and Foreign Military Financing (FMF): $5.8 billion. Totals close to $8 billion, which means cuts in other areas would be even more dramatic.
  72. challenges disaster relief
    Challenge of disaster relief is to combine good intentions with good results. Intentions alone not enough/counterproductive One of best things we can do is promote resiliency and better local control. Most extreme example Haiti (not Africa) Proximity to U.S. Role of sanctions in 1990s Influx of governmental and private aid, displacing government Speed and expedience displaces long term needs Free food displaces farmers Free medical care displaces doctors
  73. Conflict/Instability
    active/potential conflict on the continent, plus the status of fragile states that may succumb to violence and instability

    Between states (traditional) Intrastate (predominance of conflict in last several decades) Intrastate with outside provocateurs, as Cohen suggested may be more prevalent than commonly thought.
  74. Why does US care about conflict?
    Humanitarian Fear of spillover Instability as threat in itselfViews from lens of its own security more than African concerns, as will discuss on Tuesday
  75. UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
    Since July 2007, with over 17,000 military and police and 3400 civilians. Mission is end to attacks on civilians by government-supported militia; broker peace deal between Khartoum and fractured rebel groups.
  76. N Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
    Since July 2011 (same as independence for South Sudan), with almost 13,000 military and police and nearly 2000 civilians.Mission was originally to support transition to independence, but has morphed into trying to end South’s on-going civil war
  77. UN Interim Security Force for Abiyei (UNIFSA)
    Since June 2011, with almost 4500 military and 400 civilians. Peacekeeping in disputed border area of Abiyei between Sudan and South Sudan. Issues are both over oil and control over pasture vs. farming land. Interesting, started almost exclusively as Ethiopian forces blue-hatted to UN.
  78. UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
    Since April 2014, with over 12000 military and 760 civilian Mission to end sectarian violence after a coup in Bangui.
  79. UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
    Since April 2013, almost 12,000 military and 1200 civilians Began as French intervention to stave off capture of Bamako by Islamic insurgents from north
  80. UN Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL),
    which has been there since September 2003 and is now down to a little under 1700 military and police and 1200 civilians. Role now is primarily training the security services, providing over-watch.
  81. UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI),
    in country since April 2009, now down to about 2400 military and police, and 1000 civilians. Current role similar to that of UNAMIL
  82. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO
    has been in Western Sahara since 1991, ostensibly to monitor the promised referendum on WS independence
  83. UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MINUSCO
    in country since July 2010, with nearly 19,000 military/police and 3500 civilians. Probably most complex of PKOs, with robust, almost war-fighting mandate to go after rebel groups in Eastern DRC. In reality a legacy of instability caused by Rwanda genocide on top of decades of kleptocracy by Mobutu.DRC has ceased to exist as a country run by
  84. AU Mission in Somalia, (AMISOM)
    whose mission is to support the Transitional Federal Government’s efforts to re-establish control after two and half decades of being a failed state. Fight al-Shabaab.  Even more so than MINURSO, this is as much a fighting mandate as it is a PKO
  85. Lower Profile Conflict
    include counter-Lords Resistance Army operations -- led by Uganda, supported by U.S. -- in DROC, CAR, and South Sudan. Frozen (for now) 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea that resulted in roughly 80,00 combat deaths in fighting that resembled worst of World War I.
  86. .  One other useful indicator is the Fragile States Index
    produced for the last 12 years by the Fund for Peace.  Using a proprietary system weighing factors including Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Group Grievances, Human Flight/Brain Drain, Uneven Economic Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Public Services

    Poor scores do not necessarily translate into or even predict violent conflict
Author
cadence57
ID
329664
Card Set
IR 584 Midterm
Description
Sub-saharan policy midterm
Updated