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For a deterrent threat to work, it must be
- credible
- The party receiving the threat must believe that the threat will be carried out
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Deterrence depends
on perceptions
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Deterrence:
The underlying objective of deterrence is to persuade an adversary not to take an action that it otherwise would
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Categories of Deterrence(2):
-Extended deterrence: when actions of one state are designed to persuade another not to threaten a third state (preventing an attack against others)
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Categories of Deterrence(1):
-General deterrence: when one state tries to deter another from altering the status quo (preventing an attack against yourself)
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Categories of Deterrence(3):
Extended immediate deterrence- during the final stage of a crisis, the would-be attacker is persuaded to back down rather than follow
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General and extended deterrence fails when
a threat is made
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Extended immediate deterrence fails when
a threat is carried out
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For a deterrent threat to work, it must be
- credible
- The party receiving the threat must believe that the threat will be carried out
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The credibility of a deterrent threat depends on:
- -The capability to successfully carry out the threatsurvivability
- -The will to carry out the threat
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Of course, if a threat is credible,
it will never have to be carried out
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Perceptions influence decisions to
attack or not
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Perceptions: A would-be attacker only attacks when
they believe that the deterrent threat will not be carried out (or when they believe that they can defeat their adversary at an acceptable cost)
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U.S. used two separate methods of deterrence in the Cold War:
- Massive retaliation
- -MAD: mutual assured destruction
- -Flexible response
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Does deterrence work?
- -Detailed case studies of almost every major crisis conclude that deterrence does not work: threatened states did not back down-
- -But there is a selection bias: cases where there was already a crisis (and therefore a failure of deterrence)
- -In cases of credible deterrence, should never see a crisis because of effective deterrence
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Evaluating Deterrence: Achen & Snidal:
Failures of deterrence are not the equivalent of failures of deterrence theory
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Deterrence theory predicts failures of deterrence when:
- -Retaliatory threat is absent
- -Retaliatory threat is not credible, etc…
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Because decisions are influenced by perceptions, leaders may
take actions that prove more costly than had been anticipated
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To understand leaders’ decisions, must ask
what their prior beliefs were
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Bayes’ Rule:
A prior belief is changed to an updated (posterior) belief based on the observation of conditional events
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Costly Signals(3):
- -Information or signals about information can be used alter beliefs
- -To be effective, signals need to be costly
- -Signals also need to be sufficiently informative
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Terrorism:
Any act of violence undertaken for the purpose of altering a government’s political policies such that the violence targets those who do not actually have the personal authority to alter or enforce governmental policy
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Terrorists(3):
- -Terrorists as crazy, irrational fanatics
- -Many governments have policies refusing to negotiate with terrorists
- -This policy affects the perceptions of would-be terrorists
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Suppose there are two different types of people who become terrorists
- “True Believers”
- “Reluctant Terrorists”
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Also 2 types of governments:
- “responsive”- bargain with weak political parties
- “repressive”
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Reluctant Terrorists:If the government’s threat to not negotiate with terrorists is perceived as credible by the “reluctant terrorist,” then:
the reluctant terrorist is more likely to resort to violence than pursue negotiations
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An act of terrorism might actually be the work of a
reluctant terrorist, but we cannot tell from the act alone whether we are dealing with a reluctant terrorist or a true believer
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Terrorism as a Commitment Problem:Governments have a credibility problem:
- once terrorists disarm in exchange for government concessions, the government has every incentive to renege(to go back on one's word)
- For the government, it is always better to win outright than grant concessions
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In a situation with multiple terrorist factions
(hardliners and moderates), all terrorism cannot be ended by negotiations
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Solving the Commitment Problem:Terrorism can be ended by:
reaching a negotiated compromise with some (moderate) terrorists that includes their help through counterterrorism help against remaining terrorists
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Solving the Commitment Problem:The government needs to provide:
- tangible, implemented concessions in exchange (but not so large that they’ll renege)
- -Land for peace?
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